

belief that we must work to bring about further improvement,
in order that the United States can maintain its security interests
in the international environment of the 1970's.

IV. You will be hearing from senior CIA officials discuss with you what
their part of CIA does, and how it contributes to the making of
national intelligence.

A. I am confident that exchanges of facts and views in these
sessions will make CIA and intelligence more relevant to you in the
future, and lay the groundwork for mutual efforts toward the difficult
goal of protecting our national security.

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Feb
DDCI speech

DDCI'S TALK TO THE JOINT STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE
ORIENTATION COURSE

22 AUGUST 1969

Ray L. Soren
cryptologic course

Carlson & joint CIA unit 7/22/69

I. Welcome to the Central Intelligence Agency

A. The Director and senior CIA officials are happy to have this opportunity to tell you about:

1. The CIA's missions, its organization and its capabilities;
2. The Washington Intelligence Community; and
3. Cooperation between CIA and the military services in

furthering national security.

II. The sponsors of this orientation series are convinced that exchanges of this type improve cooperation and joint effectiveness.

III. Some of you have been or are now in intelligence assignments. Others no doubt will be in intelligence work in the future. Many of you are "users" of the finished intelligence product.

A. But I am sure that every member of this orientation course appreciates the growing importance and role of intelligence in making policy decisions, operational planning, force development, development of new weapons systems, and so on.

B. The value of good intelligence -- and the penalties for poor intelligence -- are growing year-by-year.

1. The more we know about a threat to our national interest, the more effectively and economically we can counter it.

2. The recent coup in Libya, the incident along the Sino-Soviet border, the intentions of Hanoi now that Ho Chi Minh has passed to his just reward, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia -- all these burning issues are, in fact, intelligence problems.

C. Some of you may remember that I pulled a tour with CIA about 20 years ago.

1. U.S. intelligence has changed a good deal -- it has improved greatly over the past 20 years.

2. But the threat is greater, so even with improvements, our net gain may be small indeed.

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DDCI's Talk to the Joint Strategic Intelligence Orientation Course

22 August 1969

PUT
THIS ON
FIRST
CARD
BY
ITSELF

Colonel Aykroyd, members of the faculty and students of the Joint Strategic Intelligence Orientation Course:

When Colonel Aykroyd invited me to address you today, he left the topic open. I proposed to talk about "Trends in Intelligence," Now, this is a pretty broad topic, and the problem of identifying the more important and persistent trends reminds me of the dilemma of a young Arab prince.

On his twenty-first birthday his father, the ruler of an oil-rich sheikdom, gave the boy a harem -- just a starter kit of 50 girls or so.

The next day, an envious friend was amazed to find the sheik's son in a coffee house at the local bazaar, sitting alone and drinking listlessly.

"Why are you hanging around here?" the friend asked. ^{"With} ~~"With~~ all those lovely, lonely girls waiting for you, don't you know what to do?"

"I know what to do," the sheik's son answered, "I just don't know where to start!"

And so it is with "Trends in Intelligence." The topic is certainly more open to a subjective interpretation, and a sheik's choice of subjects, than is the material which the members of this course have covered. But it is, I believe, most important that we who are engaged in intelligence work take time out occasionally, stand back from our day-to-day problems, and assess where we stand and in what direction we are moving. Only if we do take stock at regular intervals, can we chart a course for ourselves, instead of merely

reacting to and keeping pace with the pressures and problems that affect us all.

So let me try to identify for you several of the trends which strike me as having a significant and persistent influence upon our business.

I believe we should put at the top of this list the growing problem of geographical access for locating abroad our intelligence bases and facilities. As the cold war has thawed out more and more in the 1960's, however, our installations on foreign soil, including intelligence facilities, have become less welcome guests. A decade ago, the American presence served as a reassuring symbol of security to the host governments and peoples. Now the American presence, particularly for intelligence purposes, is being exploited by Communist propagandists and nationalist agitators ^{who portray it as} ~~in their efforts to portray~~ "imperialist" or "colonialist" domination.

Clearly we are under increasing pressures to withdraw or reduce, or to pay ever larger "rents" in the form of military and economic aid, or a larger share of the intelligence take. No particular insight is required to see that we will generally find it increasingly difficult to secure access to and use ~~the~~ ⁱⁿ real estate of countries bordering the Sino-Soviet Bloc. As a consequence, we must develop alternatives. These include technical alternatives such as mobile platforms, both terrestrial and ^{air or} space borne. Another type of substitute, in places where we can still get a foot in the door, is the more efficient and less conspicuous installation which can be operated by fewer personnel.

This trend applies to the facilities of all parts of the Intelligence Community. In some countries CIA has experienced a change in what we call "the operational environment." A good "operational environment" is one where local security and police forces cooperate with us, or at least close their eyes to our intelligence operations against the territory or facilities of our targets. Needless to say, their attitude is often a critical factor in mounting clandestine operations. The change that I alluded to concerns certain countries where cooperation has been withdrawn or the attitude has become hostile.

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This shift in attitude toward our facilities and intelligence operations is also part of a heightened sensitivity, abroad as well as in the United States, to intelligence activities. Part of this awareness and hostility has been aroused by international publicity caused by our efforts to secure intelligence. The U-2 shoot down over the USSR; the shelling of the Liberty and the capture of the Pueblo, the fairly numerous incidents over the years involving ELINT aircraft, such as the EC-121 off Korea; the arrest and jailing of agent personnel, and other intelligence flaps have caused foreign governments and their news media to become pretty twitchy where intelligence matters are concerned. This is not to point a finger of fault, but simply to state a fact of life. When we run risks, we expect accidents to occur.

This sensitivity does not, however, stem from intelligence incidents alone. The change in attitude is, in part, a result of the recognition of the great importance of good intelligence in today's world. I'll come back to

this point. But the Communist Bloc has also exploited intelligence incidents to the fullest, as a part of their general anti-U.S. campaign, through diplomatic pressure and propaganda charges, [↓] And local Communist elements have agitated a great deal. The intelligence services of the Communist states have trumped-up charges of espionage against innocent Western tourists. They have also ^{muddled the waters} ~~obfuscated the facts~~ through a campaign of forgery and vilification directed against U. S. intelligence. CIA especially has been the target of this effort in the underdeveloped countries. Whether the host government acts from greed, resentment or hostility, or is simply unable to stand the heat of opposition criticism, the result is the same -- the operational environment turns chilly.

The assumed ubiquitous character of CIA is most humorously illustrated by a New Yorker cartoon of several years past. The cartoon shows a group of natives watching a volcano erupt. The caption reads: "Pass it along. The CIA did it!"

Foreign sensitivity toward intelligence activities has its counterpart within the United States. In addition to the incidents mentioned above, you are all familiar with the publicity generated by the disclosure of CIA support to U. S. students ^{and} and other activities which were directed at overseas targets. There has been a rash of spy literature and television

PROGRAMS. ALL THESE HAVE COMBINED TO SENSITIZE CERTAIN SECTORS OF PUBLIC OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES. MANY DOMESTIC CRITICS OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES HAVE DEVELOPED A KIND OF KNEE-JERK REACTION. THEY DO NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE PURPOSES OF INTELLIGENCE, AND THE GREAT CONTRIBUTION INTELLIGENCE MAKES TO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES. ON THE CONTRARY, THEY IMMEDIATELY RUSH TO BELIEVE THE WORST AND ISSUE FORTH WITH BLANKET CONDEMNATIONS.

PLEASE UNDERSTAND THAT I AM NOT TRYING TO MAINTAIN THAT MISTAKES HAVE NOT OCCURRED, OR THAT THE RISKS WE RUN HAVE NOT OCCASIONALLY BEEN MISCALCULATED. I AM SAYING THAT GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE CRITICS ALIKE SHOULD TRY TO BE OBJECTIVE AND TO KEEP THE EQUITIES--AS WELL AS THE OCCASIONAL DISADVANTAGES--IN MIND WHEN THEY DISCUSS THE SUBJECT. ^{As of some} WE CAN HELP ~~SOME~~ BY CONDITIONING OUR PRIVATE ATTITUDES ALONG THAT SAME LINE;

ANOTHER FORM OF CRITICISM OFTEN PRODUCED BY MAJOR INTERNATIONAL CRISES CONCERNS ACCUSATIONS OF AN "INTELLIGENCE FAILURE." THE ERECTION OF THE BERLIN WALL, WARS AND COUPS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, THE DOMINICAN CRISIS, THE ¹⁹⁶⁸ ~~RECENT~~ TET OFFENSIVE ^{in Vietnam} AND MANY OTHER MAJOR EVENTS

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HAVE BEEN FOLLOWED BY CHARGES THAT U.S. INTELLIGENCE FAILED TO PROVIDE WARNINGS.

AS YOU KNOW, INTELLIGENCE WARNING HAS, IN FACT, BEEN GIVEN PRIOR TO MANY, IF NOT MOST, OF THESE CRISES. PUTTING ASIDE THE PROBLEM OF WHETHER THE ~~THE~~ CRITICS ARE WELL INFORMED, THE CHARGE OF FAILURE USUALLY STEMS FROM ONE OF TWO FACTORS. THE FIRST INVOLVES THE INTELLIGENCE WARNING ITSELF. JUST HOW PRECISE CAN INTELLIGENCE BE EXPECTED TO BE IN PREDICTING HOSTILE ACTIONS? OBVIOUSLY IT IS DESIRABLE THAT WE GIVE ADVANCE NOTICE OF EXACTLY THE WHAT, WHERE, WHEN, HOW AND WHY OF THE HOSTILE ACTION OR DEVELOPMENT. THIS DEGREE OF PERFECTION HAS SELDOM ~~HAPPENED~~ ^{BEEN} ~~ATTAINED~~ IN THE HISTORY OF INTELLIGENCE. ONE BENDS EVERY EFFORT TO GIVE THE POLICY MAKER THIS KIND OF WARNING, BUT ONLY RARELY IS IT POSSIBLE TO ~~SO~~ ^{SUFFICIENTLY} PENETRATE THE ENEMY'S PROTECTIVE BARRIERS TO PROVIDE A FULLY RELIABLE, DETAILED NOTICE IN ADVANCE OF THE PRECISE NATURE OF A HOSTILE ACTION. IN THIS AREA, CRYPTOLOGY IS OUR MOST EFFECTIVE WEAPON.

THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN IS THAT IN MANY CASES OF SO-CALLED FAILURES, WE HAVE PROVIDED INTELLIGENCE WARNINGS, BUT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT--FOR VARIOUS REASONS--HAS NOT BEEN IN A POSITION TO DO

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anything about it. The constraints of today's world sometimes make it a losing proposition to act on what we know. This is certainly frustrating.

In other cases, policy-makers are unwilling to accept an intelligence warning which is not palatable and which would require action. This is the problem of intelligence credibility. In either case the uninformed critic confuses dismay, which stems from our inability to act, with what he then calls "surprise".

Another factor we must face is the constantly improving security of our principal intelligence targets. To a certain extent this is the old race, well known in military matters, between the offense and the defense as it applies to intelligence.


The defensive abilities of our main targets seem to grow as the present limbo between real peace and major war lengthens out. During military hostilities, intelligence opportunities tend to open up, as the enemy's security slackens.

As we leave World War II further behind, the security of our intelligence targets becomes better organized and more effective. As a result, ever more extensive, costly and imaginative efforts are required to penetrate the security barriers and to produce high level intelligence results.

The trends I have been discussing so far largely concern the world outside the Intelligence Community -- our intelligence targets, third country governments and peoples, and our critics. Let us identify a few trends within the profession itself.

Although the funds expended and the personnel employed in intelligence purposes are closely guarded, it is well understood that both have been steadily increasing for the past fifteen years. Apart from inflationary pressures at home and abroad, there are several reasons for this.

Obviously, with successive pay raises, our personnel costs have risen, and this is no small item. But even more important has been the development of technologically advanced systems to collect and exploit data obtainable by sophisticated sensors. The systems are large and costly, and they require highly skilled personnel. Many of them use mobile platforms or are designed for operation in unusual locations. They often gobble up vast quantities of data which require expensive efforts for reduction and processing, before the data become useful to intelligence analysts. The decision to develop and operate one of these systems is usually a "big" decision, involving hundreds of millions of dollars and thousands of people.

The development of such systems is one way to overcome some of the problems I referred to earlier, such as the improving security and counter-intelligence effort of our main targets, and the growing limitations on our use of the territories of third countries. But the impetus to operate these systems also stems from our desire to produce better intelligence for the policy maker, the operations officer and the force planner. To do this requires using, and many times pushing, the state-of-the-art  and to do so is costly.

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ANOTHER STIMULUS TO THE EXPANSION OF INTELLIGENCE STAFFS[#] AND BUDGETS IS THE GROWING INTEREST OF OUR POLICY MAKERS IN EVERY AREA OF THE WORLD. BEFORE 1960, THE SOVIET UNION WAS THE PRIMARY FOCUS OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE. THE SOVIET UNION AND (MORE RECENTLY) COMMUNIST CHINA CONTINUE TO BE OUR NUMBER ONE TARGETS, BUT THE APPETITES OF OUR ~~CONSUMERS OF INTEL-
LIGENCE~~^{CUSTOMERS} NOW EXTEND TO THE POLITICAL, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS OF ALMOST ANY COUNTRY YOU MAY CARE TO NAME. ~~THEY ARE~~^{THESE APPETITES} GETTING MORE VORACIOUS ~~AS~~^{WITH} EACH CRISIS~~, MOUNTS~~.^{WITH} THUS, IT HAS BECOME NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN AT LEAST A MINIMUM COLLECTION EFFORT AND ANALYTICAL EXPERTISE ON EACH AND EVERY OUT-OF-THE-WAY COUNTRY, AGAINST THE MOMENT WHEN IT MAY BE PROPELLED INTO THE HEADLINES THROUGH A COUP, A WAR, OR SOME OTHER NATIONAL UPHEAVAL.

THERE IS YET ANOTHER TREND AFFECTING US ALL AS A RESULT OF THE GROWING DOLLAR AND PERSONNEL COSTS OF INTELLIGENCE. I REFER HERE TO THE PRESSURES FOR ECONOMY IN INTELLIGENCE. THE ~~GOVERNMENT'S REDUCTION~~^{reduction} IN PERSONNEL ABROAD IS ONE MANIFESTATION OF THIS. I AM SURE WE AGREE THAT EACH MEMBER AGENCY IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS OCCASIONALLY SUNK A DRY HOLE

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and may do so again in the future. But in today's climate it is vital that we all be economy-minded. In particular, we should work hard to eliminate activities that are outmoded or of marginal usefulness [✓] just as hard as we ~~are willing to~~ work to achieve an important new advance. Given the growth of the U.S. intelligence budget, certainly the economy trend will continue to be with us and it is appropriate that we respond positively to the President's economy policy.

Now, what about the fruits of our labor? The trend here is the most reassuring and satisfying of all. It is my considered judgment that our national intelligence stands at a level which has not been surpassed since World War II. Our intelligence product is good, and I am confident it will continue to improve. We do have gaps in information on some of our most important targets, and we should expect that this will continue to be the case. Occasionally our intelligence judgments are faulty. For that matter, looking back over the past year, we know that the intelligence analysts in Moscow and Peking have certainly suffered some major "intelligence failures."

Speaking of our intelligence product as a whole, we have sufficient feedback from top U. S. policy makers to know that intelligence is playing a role of major significance in their decision making on many of the most critical issues facing our Government today. The members of the U. S. Intelligence Board know how often key figures in the foreign affairs community and our defense establishment request USIB views on a variety of special subjects. These requests are frequent, and they bear on most of the critical decisions facing our top leaders.

In taking satisfaction in the present high status and value of the U.S. intelligence effort, I do not mean to suggest that we can afford to be smug. A truly professional group avoids this pitfall, for as holy writ has it, "pride goes before a fall."

Nor can we in the different parts of the Intelligence Community afford the shortsightedness of indulging what I would call a "tribalistic" attitude of seeing only the problems or interests of one's immediate shop or Agency. We must work hard to foster a spirit of genuine cooperation, whereby we all see our problems in the context of the total effort of the Intelligence Community. In a word, we need empathy in our work. If we hold to this approach, I am confident that the already recognized and still growing value of the national intelligence effort will outweigh all of the other intelligence trends I have discussed with you today.

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